This proposal serves to nullify the irretrievably deposited virtual balances of a number of relayers which exploit the current inability of frontends (due to the infeasibility of client side analysis, and the impossibility of keeping updated server side resources on IPFS deployments) to properly analyze relayers engaging in behaviour which encourages sybil-like attacks. This can be considered alike to a validator slashing mechanism.
Since there exists no circumstance within which relayers would not be informed of this (and relayers necessarily must be informed considering that they have to read documentation, and we also expect relayers to monitor community activity, meaning from their side out), Governance may understand this as unwanted behaviour and thus disincentivizes it from happening via nullifications until a better solution is achieved. The relayers have been via determined via programmatic methods.
At the moment, 8 relayer-cheaters with virtual balances larger than zero in staking have been identified:
- More on this relayer below
The only exception is the relayer
abracadabra-money-gone.eth, whose owner contacted me over a week ago and said that all withdrawals through the tornado instance (rather than the router) were for testing purposes, and they represent less than 5% of the total withdrawals. I checked the transaction history of this relayer and came to the conclusion that compensation of all unpaid commissions in double amount will be enough, if this relayer continues to work honestly, as he did the whole previous year. Unpaid comission amount will be burned and distributed to stakers.
Rewards from user withdrawals should be distributed to lockers. Staker balances are unallocated commissions, and burning all balances is not correct, because cheating relayers have not yet made enough transactions (and there are not enough unpaid commissions) to cover the entire balance of relayers.
Burning all balances of cheating relayers will result in a one-time distribution of TORN as a reward among the stakers at the time of the proposal execution, which may allow an unscrupulous actor to lock a large amount of TORN in Governance without any risks right before the proposal is executed, then receive reward and unlock all tokens.
You have a day to discuss the proposal, exactly in 24 hours the proposal will be published in the blockchain and voting will be open.